Presented here are the cases of two secondary social studies teachers who were participants in a larger research endeavor designed to examine the enduring effects of a preservice teacher preparation program rooted in problem-based historical inquiry (PBHI) on their in-service beliefs and practices. The study was designed to revisit graduates of this teacher preparation program after they completed their induction into the profession. The two teachers selected for closer examination in this piece had relatively similar preservice teacher experiences and taught (...) in the same city school system. Findings indicate that the preservice program continued to impact both to some extent. However, their current beliefs about social studies teaching and their typical classroom practices differed greatly. Evidence suggests that these differences may be attributed to their personal dispositions and their conceptions of the role of the teacher. (shrink)

Three studies were conducted to explore the psychological determinants of COVID-deterrent behaviors. In Study 1, using data collected and analyzed both before and after the release of COVID-19 vaccines, mask-wearing, other preventative behaviors like social distancing, and vaccination intentions were positively related to assessments of the Coronavirus Behavioral Health Mindset ; belief in the credibility of science; progressive political orientation; less use of repressive and more use of sensitization coping; and the attribution of COVID-19 safety to effort rather than ability, (...) powerful forces, fate, or luck. In Study 2, favorable COVID-19 vaccination intentions were related to greater willingness to work, lower emotional distress, and greater customer experience mindset. Study 3 examined the personality and motives of individuals who volunteered to help deliver COVID-19 inoculations to the local community. The vaccine-giving volunteers, especially those with prosocial motives, had high CVBHM scores, belief in the credibility of science, low use of repressive coping, greater attribution of COVID-19 protection to effort, low likelihood of voting conservative, were older, and had more education than others. The majority of public health volunteers expressed prosocial motives to help people or join a cause, but many expressed the personal motives of getting the COVID-19 vaccination for themselves, conveying a public image of compassion, or structuring time. Based on the three research studies, a COVID-19 Mindset Hierarchy model is proposed to integrate the results. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary collection of essays highlights the relevance of Buddhist doctrine and practice to issues of globalization. From philosophical, religious, historical, and political perspectives, the authors show that Buddhism—arguably the world’s first transnational religion—is a rich resource for navigating todays interconnected world.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive CosmosJohn W. LangoBrian G. Henning The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive Cosmos University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 250 + xii pp.The aim of this interesting but flawed book by Brian Henning may be related through some remarks about the terms in its title.1 The term "creativity" stems from the most basic category (...) in Whitehead's metaphysics in Process and Reality, "The Category of the Ultimate." The term "processive cosmos" echoes the full title of Whitehead's magnum opus: Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. For Whitehead's metaphysics is both a philosophy of process and a philosophical cosmology. Thus, as the term "ethics" implies, Henning's book "presents a Whiteheadian ethic" (p. 8), an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics. This ethics is grounded particularly in Whitehead's axiology of aesthetic value (hence the term "beauty"), and it includes an environmental ethics (hence the linkage of the terms "morality" and "nature"). The inclusion of environmental ethics is central to the book's aim:If we are to have any hope of reversing the potentially catastrophic destruction and consumption of our natural environment, we must devise an ethical theory grounded in an axiology that acknowledges that every individual—from the most insignificant flicker of existence at the opposite end of the universe to complex individuals such as ourselves—has value not only for itself, but for others, and for the whole of reality.(p. 2)"The aim of this project, then, is," according to Henning's own summary, "to develop and defend a holistic, organic ethical theory grounded firmly in Whitehead's aesthetico-metaphysics of process" (p. 3).Indeed, Henning's project is worthwhile. Traditional ethical theory should be enlarged to include environmental ethics. Insofar as an ethics can be grounded on a metaphysics, it is important to explore how an ethics can be grounded on Whitehead's metaphysics. Since Whitehead's metaphysics is a philosophical cosmology, it is especially suitable as a grounding for an environmental ethics. Accordingly, in reading Henning's book, process philosophers should encounter many interesting ideas. [End Page 450]Nonetheless, the book has some significant flaws. First, there is a problem of audience. In addition to process philosophers, Henning wants his book to be accessible to philosophers who are not conversant with Whitehead's metaphysics, as the following passage evidences:Anyone seeking to develop a moral philosophy based on Whitehead's work faces many challenges. One obvious reason for the relative lack of attention given to Whitehead's work by mainstream environmental and moral philosophers is the density and abstruseness of the texts themselves. Coupled with the generally unfavorable view of metaphysical speculation among most contemporary ethicists, this has led many to admire Whitehead's work from afar. Given this, a secondary, though not unimportant, goal of this project is to show the value of Whitehead's complex process metaphysics for moral and environmental philosophy by presenting it in language that strives for clarity and seeks to do justice to the richness and nuances of his thought.(p. 8)Unfortunately, in the judgment of this reviewer, this secondary goal is not accomplished. The first chapter of Henning's book ("From Mechanism to Organism") contains an exposition of Whitehead's metaphysics (pp. 27–37). But this exposition is far too brief. Whitehead's technical terms are not explained sufficiently, and quotations from his writings are used too frequently. In subsequent chapters, an understanding of his metaphysics is presupposed. For example, the second chapter ("An Ecstatic Axiology") defends "an alternative to the classical interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics" (p. 42), namely, "the ecstatic interpretation" (p. 51). (The classical interpretation is exemplified by Ivor Leclerc and William Christian, and the alternative interpretation by Jorge Nobo and Judith Jones.) Specialists in Whitehead should find this second chapter accessible, but nonspecialists are likely to find it unenlightening. Before attempting to read Henning's interesting book, I would encourage mainstream environmental and moral philosophers to study Whitehead's metaphysics from other sources.Acceptance of Henning's aim of developing an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics is impeded by "the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive CosmosJohn W. LangoBrian G. Henning The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality and Nature in a Processive Cosmos University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 250 + xii pp.The aim of this interesting but flawed book by Brian Henning may be related through some remarks about the terms in its title.1 The term "creativity" stems from the most basic category (...) in Whitehead's metaphysics in Process and Reality, "The Category of the Ultimate." The term "processive cosmos" echoes the full title of Whitehead's magnum opus: Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. For Whitehead's metaphysics is both a philosophy of process and a philosophical cosmology. Thus, as the term "ethics" implies, Henning's book "presents a Whiteheadian ethic" (p. 8), an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics. This ethics is grounded particularly in Whitehead's axiology of aesthetic value (hence the term "beauty"), and it includes an environmental ethics (hence the linkage of the terms "morality" and "nature"). The inclusion of environmental ethics is central to the book's aim:If we are to have any hope of reversing the potentially catastrophic destruction and consumption of our natural environment, we must devise an ethical theory grounded in an axiology that acknowledges that every individual—from the most insignificant flicker of existence at the opposite end of the universe to complex individuals such as ourselves—has value not only for itself, but for others, and for the whole of reality.(p. 2)"The aim of this project, then, is," according to Henning's own summary, "to develop and defend a holistic, organic ethical theory grounded firmly in Whitehead's aesthetico-metaphysics of process" (p. 3).Indeed, Henning's project is worthwhile. Traditional ethical theory should be enlarged to include environmental ethics. Insofar as an ethics can be grounded on a metaphysics, it is important to explore how an ethics can be grounded on Whitehead's metaphysics. Since Whitehead's metaphysics is a philosophical cosmology, it is especially suitable as a grounding for an environmental ethics. Accordingly, in reading Henning's book, process philosophers should encounter many interesting ideas. [End Page 450]Nonetheless, the book has some significant flaws. First, there is a problem of audience. In addition to process philosophers, Henning wants his book to be accessible to philosophers who are not conversant with Whitehead's metaphysics, as the following passage evidences:Anyone seeking to develop a moral philosophy based on Whitehead's work faces many challenges. One obvious reason for the relative lack of attention given to Whitehead's work by mainstream environmental and moral philosophers is the density and abstruseness of the texts themselves. Coupled with the generally unfavorable view of metaphysical speculation among most contemporary ethicists, this has led many to admire Whitehead's work from afar. Given this, a secondary, though not unimportant, goal of this project is to show the value of Whitehead's complex process metaphysics for moral and environmental philosophy by presenting it in language that strives for clarity and seeks to do justice to the richness and nuances of his thought.(p. 8)Unfortunately, in the judgment of this reviewer, this secondary goal is not accomplished. The first chapter of Henning's book ("From Mechanism to Organism") contains an exposition of Whitehead's metaphysics (pp. 27–37). But this exposition is far too brief. Whitehead's technical terms are not explained sufficiently, and quotations from his writings are used too frequently. In subsequent chapters, an understanding of his metaphysics is presupposed. For example, the second chapter ("An Ecstatic Axiology") defends "an alternative to the classical interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics" (p. 42), namely, "the ecstatic interpretation" (p. 51). (The classical interpretation is exemplified by Ivor Leclerc and William Christian, and the alternative interpretation by Jorge Nobo and Judith Jones.) Specialists in Whitehead should find this second chapter accessible, but nonspecialists are likely to find it unenlightening. Before attempting to read Henning's interesting book, I would encourage mainstream environmental and moral philosophers to study Whitehead's metaphysics from other sources.Acceptance of Henning's aim of developing an ethics grounded in Whitehead's metaphysics is impeded by "the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:274 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY poisoning, spying, etc., which would render postwar mutual confidence impossible, shall not be countenanced. It is mainly with an eye to these preliminary articles that Professor Wilhelm Miiller argues for Kant's relevance to contemporary political problems. Miiller begins by drawing an analogy between the Peace of Basle (1795) and the Treaty of Versailles: in both instances, it is claimed, secret reservations at the treaty table, (...) the identification of defeated nation with "guilty" nation, and the deprivation of an entire "guiltless" people of "the most primitive right to live" helped lay the foundations for future wars. Miiller sees in the willful dispersion, through motives of revenge and greed, of the possessions of conquered nations after both World Wars a "reversion to the wildest barbarism." He defends Kant's stricture against standing armies as being "simply and logically irrefutable" in spite of Kant's toleration--understandable in 1795--of limited and voluntary militias adequate for national defense. He infers from Kant's warning against national economic dependency the urgent need to exclude international capitalism from world politics. He suggests that Kant's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of nations has been violated in the splitting of East from West Germany. And he insinuates that the present form of government in the U.S. is democratic and republican only in name, being in actuality a capitalist oligarchy whose two-party system tends to degenerate into a one-party system. Professor Miiller is entitled to his views. The reader, however, is entitled to a more objective exposition of Kant's essay and perhaps even to hope for a more critical and searching appraisal of Kant's doctrines. One opportunity for the latter surely offers itself in regard to Kant's analogy between personal and international morality. The analogy might conceivably break down over the difficulty of assigning collective moral and legal responsibility. If, as Kant maintains, a state is a moral person, it should follow that it and not merely its constituent members taken singly has moral responsibility for what it undertakes. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Kant thought through the implications of his premise, it is clear that Professor Miiller has not done so. Whereas he considers atrocious the branding of the German people as guilty of international crime in either World War, he allows himself the judgment that the "Christian" people of Europe and America were guilty of mass-murder on both occasions. The inconsistency is evident. Left unexamined and even unmentioned are the following: Kant's well-known ethical principles--the concept of practical reason, the phenomenal-noumenal duality, the notion of design in nature, the doctrine of the Categorical Imperative binding on any rational will--upon which he explicitly grounds Perpetual Peace; his efforts to refute the notion of theoretical conflict between morality and politics; his misleading use of the language of the social contract theorists throughout the essay; his proposal, anticipatory of later British philosophers, that the principle of publicity is a necessary if not sufficient condition of morally proper legislation. Perpetual Peace deserves more than Professor Mfiller has given it. PETER FUSS University of California, Riverside The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill 1812-1848. Edited by Francis E. Mineka, with an Introduction by F. A. Hayek. Two vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Routledge g: Kegan Paul. Pp. xxvii + 784. $20.00.) These two volumes of early correspondence are the first volumes to appear of a projected new edition of Mill's collected works. If the subsequent volumes maintain the high level of competence achieved here, the new edition will prove a valuable assistance to nineteenth- BOOK REVIEWS 275 century scholars. Of the 537 letters published, 238 have never before been in print, and 72 others have hitherto appeared only in part. Most of the work of assembling the letters was done by F. A. Hayek, but the extremely useful annotation was prepared by Francis E. Mineka. We are told that he and Dwight N. Lindley are planning an edition of the later letters (1849-1873). The earliest letter extant (printed in facsimile and hitherto unpublished) was written, at the age of 6, to Bentham. It... (shrink)

This is the first book to offer the best essays, articles, and speeches on ethics and intelligence that demonstrate the complex moral dilemmas in intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Some are recently declassified and never before published, and all are written by authors whose backgrounds are as varied as their insights, including Robert M. Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; John P. Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, (...) Georgetown University; and Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and recipient of the Owens Award for contributions to the understanding of U.S. intelligence activities. Creating the foundation for the study of ethics and intelligence by filling in the gap between warfare and philosophy, this is a valuable collection of literature for building an ethical code that is not dependent on any specific agency, department, or country. (shrink)

This book explores, for the first time, John Webster's contribution to one of the most important and contested topics in Christian theology: the relationship between divine and human agency. Jones achieves this through close study of Webster texts ranging from his early, middle and late periods. It highlights that Webster's moral ontology is not only a major theme in his thought but is among his most significant contributions to contemporary systematic and moral theology. This text will be of (...) interest to Webster scholars and those teaching courses in late modern systematic theology and theological ethics. (shrink)

Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, (...) and causality. They include Kohler, Libet, Popper, Lindahl, Arhem, Charman, Pockett, John, McFadden, Fingelkurts, Maxwell, and Jones. They’re classifiable as computationalist, reductionist, dualist, realist, interactionist, epiphenomenalist, globalist, and localist. However, they’ve never been analysed together as a whole, which hinders evaluations of them. This article tries to rectify this. It concludes that while field theories face challenges, they aren’t easily dismissed, for they draw on considerable evidence and may avoid serious problems in neuroscience concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, causality, and ontology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:W. T. Jones SOMNIO ERGO SUM: DESCARTES'S THREE DREAMS What is remarkable about Descartes's dreams is not that he dreamed (for even philosophers presumably dream), but that he wrote down a description of his dreams and of his interpretation of them and then kept this record for more than thirty years, until his death.* What is remarkable, in a word, is that this thinker, who prided himself on (...) his rationalism and who has come to represent, at least to philosophers, the very spirit of rationalism, should have taken his dreams so seriously. Philosophers—perhaps because the dreams conflict with their view of Descartes, perhaps because they conflict with their view of themselves and their discipline—have tended to play down the dreams or to ignore them altogether. Thus, though Bernard Williams, the author of a recent volume on Descartes, refers to the dreams as "a significant event," he proceeds in a footnote to undercut the adjective by quoting Christiaan Huygens, apparently with approval, to the effect that the dreams show "a great weakness [in Descartes], and I think that it will seem much the same to Catholics who have freed themselves from bigotry." If we try to free ourselves from what seems to be a standing philosophical prejudice against dreams and dreaming, what can Descartes's dreams tell us about his theories? That is the topic of this article. But first a caveat concerning my position on the interpretation of dreams generally. The interpreter of a dream, like the interpreter of other cultural products, has to try to steer a course between the Scylla of overinterpretation (reading into the dream something that is not expressed in it) and the Charybdis of underinterpretation (missing something that is actually expressed in the dream). My own bias leads me to fear overinterpretation more than underinterpretation; I had?Descartes's original Latin record of the dreams no longer survives. A new English translation by my colleague, John F. Benton, of a late seventeenth-century paraphrase of a portion of Descartes's text appears as an appendix to this article. 145 146Philosophy and Literature rather go aground on Charybdis than be shipwrecked on the Scylla of the Freudians and the Jungians.2 I am skeptical of interpretations of Descartes's dreams that are not supported by nondream materials—on the assumption that any dynamic element expressed in the dreams that is not also expressed in nondream materials is unlikely to be of much importance for understanding Descartes's thought. Therefore, instead of beginning with the dreams and then looking here and there in nondream materials for supporting evidence, I shall begin with nondream materials and only later turn to the dreams. In a word, I shall try to read back both from nondream material and from dream material to dynamic elements which may be present in, and shaping, both. My hope is that the uncovering of these elements will result in a better understanding of nondream and dream material alike. I Accordingly, I shall begin with a brief account of some of the themes of two of Descartes's best known philosophical writings, The Discourse on Method (1637) and the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). The Discourse is particularly relevant to our inquiry because it "covers" the period in which the dreams occur, but in a very different medium from that of the Olympica and at a later date. The Discourse was in fact a discreet, as it were sanitized, version of the whole long voyage of discovery in which the dreams were but one, if nonetheless a critical, episode. Descartes tells us he had been educated "at one of the most celebrated schools in Europe" and had not beenjudged by his instructors "inferior" to his fellow students. Yet, on completing his course of study, he found himself "embarrassed with so many doubts and errors" that the only result of his efforts to instruct himself had been the "increasing discovery" of his own ignorance. Having gone through all the sciences of his time—languages, literature, rhetoric, theology, philosophy—without learning anything of consequence, he had then turned to travel, to seeing courts and armies, hoping thereby to discover the answers he sought "in... (shrink)

Glial cells play a central role in the development and function of complex nervous systems. Drosophila is an excellent model organism for the study of mechanisms underlying neural development, and recent attention has been focused on the differentiation and function of glial cells. We now have a nearly complete description of glial cell organization in the embryo, which enables a systematic genetic analysis of glial cell development. Most glia arise from neural stem cells that originate in the neurogenic ectoderm. The (...) bifurcation of glial and neuronal fates is under the control of the glial promoting factor glial cells missing. Differentiation is propagated through the regulation of several transcription factors. Genes have been discovered affecting the terminal differentiation of glia, including the promotion glial–neuronal interactions and the formation of the blood–nerve barrier. Other roles of glia are being explored, including their requirement for axon guidance, neuronal survival, and signaling. BioEssays 23:877–887, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Experiential evidence shows that pain is associated with common meanings. These include a meaning of threat or danger, which is experienced as immediately distressing or unpleasant; cognitive meanings, which are focused on the long-term consequences of having chronic pain; and existential meanings such as hopelessness, which are more about the person with chronic pain than the pain itself. This interdisciplinary book - the second in the three-volume Meanings of Pain series edited by Dr Simon van Rysewyk - aims to better (...) understand pain by describing experiences of pain and the meanings these experiences hold for the people living through them. The lived experiences of pain described here involve various types of chronic pain, including spinal pain, labour pain, rheumatic pain, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, endometriosis-associated pain, and cancer-related pain. Two chapters provide narrative descriptions of pain, recounted and interpreted by people with pain. Language is important to understanding the meaning of pain since it is the primary tool human beings use to manipulate meaning. As discussed in the book, linguistic meaning may hold clues to understanding some pain-related experiences, including the stigmatisation of people with pain, the dynamics of patient-clinician communication, and other issues, such as relationships between pain, public policy and the law, and attempts to develop a taxonomy of pain that is meaningful for patients. Clinical implications are described in each chapter. This book is intended for people with pain, their family members or caregivers, clinicians, researchers, advocates, and policy makers. (shrink)

According to Jones & Love (J&L), Bayesian theories are too often isolated from other theories and behavioral processes. Here, we highlight examples of two types of isolation from the field of word learning. Specifically, Bayesian theories ignore emergence, critical to development theory, and have not probed the behavioral details of several key phenomena, such as the effect.

The idea for this collection of essays arose out of conversations I had with D. Z. Phillips in Claremont in 2000: a set of philosophical essays recognizing and arising out of something I took to be both interesting and good going on at University College, Swansea, roughly from the 1950s into the 1990s. I envisioned eight essays, each in some way taking up the work of one of eight individuals - Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, R. F. Holland, J. R. (...) class='Hi'>Jones, H. O. Mounce, D. Z. Phillips, Ilham Dilman, and R. W. Beardsmore - each of whom taught at Swansea for a substantial period during those years, these being followed by a ninth essay providing something of an overview of the other eight essays and thereby of philosophy at Swansea during the same period. (shrink)

ArgumentThe paper explores the use of Freud's methods of dream interpretation by four English writers of the early twentieth century: T. H. Pear, W. H. R. Rivers, Ernest Jones, and Alix Strachey. Each employed their own dreams in rather different ways: as part of an assessment of Freud's work as a psychological theory, as illustrative of the cogency of Freud's method and theories as part of the psychoanalytic process. Each adopted different approaches to the question of privacy and decorum. (...) The paper argues that assessment of the impact of Freud's work must take account of the application of the method to the researcher's own dreams and the personal impact this process of analysis had upon them, and must also gauge how the dreamers' deployment of Freud's methods influenced their explicit relationship to him and his theories.The dream, then, is the chief gate by which we can enter into the knowledge of the unconscious…. Thoughts and desires, which, if they attempted to dominate consciousness in waking life, would be promptly suppressed, arise, develop and expand to an astonishing extent in the dream.This statement, of course, is entirely independent of the implications of any one “theory of dreams.” Its truth is evident to anyone who has honestly recorded or considered his own dreams for even a short period. (shrink)

The honour of being the first to teach philosophy in Australia belongs to the Congregationalist minister Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), in the 1850s, but teaching philosophy did not formally begin until the 1880s, with the establishment of universities (Grave 1984). -/- Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: Idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. It was particularly associated with the work of the first professional philosophers in Australia, such as Henry Laurie (...) (1837–1922), Francis Anderson (1858–1941), William Mitchell (1861–1962) (who rejected the label) and a second generation including W. R. Boyce Gibson (1869–1935). Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, together with the British, particularly Scottish, revival of interest in Hegel through the work of the ‘Absolute Idealists’ T. H. Green (1836–1882), F. H. Bradley (1846–1924) and Henry Jones (1852–1922), the latter of whom conducted a popular lecture tour of Australia (Boucher 1990). -/- A number of the early New Zealand philosophers, including Duncan MacGregor (1843–1906), William Salmond (1835–1917), and Francis W. Dunlop (1874–1932) were educated in the Idealist tradition and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. William Anderson (1889–1955), at Auckland, brother of John at Sydney, was the only New Zealand philosopher that seemed to retain Idealist views. -/- In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who can be said to have influenced both strands of Australian philosophical thought. (shrink)

Patient decision aids enable patients to be better informed about the potential benefits and harms of their healthcare options. Certification of patient decision aids at the national level in the United States is a critical step towards responsible governance—primarily as a quality measure that increases patients’ safety, as mandated in the U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Certification would provide a verification process to identify conflicts of interest that may otherwise bias the scientific evidence presented in decision aids. (...) Certification also benefits clinicians who may otherwise face malpractice claims based on harm to patients caused by possible reliance on patient decision aids that are inaccurate, incomplete, or presented in a manner that biases the patient’s decision. Existing work by the International Patient Decision Aid Standards Collaboration could guide the establishment of a certification process within the U.S. This article argues for national certification of patient decision aids and discusses how that may be achieved. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and PsychologyArticlesAntonak, R. J., C. R. Fielder, and J. A. Mulick. 1993. A scale of attitudes toward the application of eugenics to the treatment of people with mental retardation. Journal of Intellect Disabilities Research 37:75–83.Arens, K. 1996. Commentary on “Lumps and bumps.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:15–16.Bavidge, M. 1996. Commentary on “Minds, memes, and multiples.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, (...) & Psychology 3:29–30.Blashfield, R. K. 1973. Evaluation of the DSM-II classification of schizophrenia as a nomenclature. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85(2):140–150.Braude, S. E. 1996. Multiple personality and moral responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:37–54.Broverman, I. K., S. R. Vogel, D. M. Broverman et al. 1972. Sex-role stereotypes: a current appraisal. Journal of Social Issues 28:59–78.Broverman, I. K., D. M. Broverman, P. E. Clarkson et al. 1975. Sex-role stereotypes and clinical judgments of mental health. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 34:1–7.Checkland, D., and M. Silberfeld. 1996. Mental competence and the question of beneficient intervention. Theoretical Medicine 17(2):121–134.Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Commentary on “Multiple personality and moral responsibility.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:55–57.Clark, S. R. L. 1996. Minds, memes, and multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:21–28.Dickenson, D., and D. Jones. 1995. True wishes: The philosophy and developmental psychology of children’s informed consent. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:287–303.Donaldson, T. 1978. Psychoanalyzing the practical inference model. Philosophical Research Archives 4:1215.Eekelaar, J. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:305–307.Fisher, S., and R. P. Greenberg. 1993. How sound is the double-blind design for evaluating psychotropic drugs? Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 181:345–350.Fulwiler, C., and M. F. Folstein. 1995. Commentary on “Chris Walker’s interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ phenomenology.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:345–346.Heinze, M. 1995. Commentary on “Moralist or therapist?” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:31–32.Iturrate, M. 1977. Man’s freedom: Freud’s therapeutic goal. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 15:32–45.Littlewood, R. 1991. From diseae to illness and back again. Lancet 337:1013–1015.Maddox, J. 1993. New genetics means no new ethics. Nature 364:97.McCormick, S. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:309–310.Murray, T. H. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:311–312.Muzika, E. G. 1989. Object relations theory, Buddhism, and the self-synthesis of eastern and western approaches. International Philosophical Quarterly 30(1):59–74.Parker, M. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:313–314.Phillips, J. 1996. Key concepts: Hermeneutics. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:61–69.Pole, D. 1970. Self and personality. The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1:30–36.Priebe, S. 1989. On the subjectivity of psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric Praxis 16:86–89.Radden, J. 1996. Lumps and bumps: Kantian faculty psychology, phrenology, and twentieth-century psychiatric classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:1–14.Sampson, E. E. 1981. Cognitive psychology as ideology. American Psychologist 36:730–743.Sarbin, T. R. 1976. Contextualism: A worldview for modern psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 24:1–41.Senft, P. A. 1975. The self-contradictions (antinomies) of psychotherapy: Is a solution in social action possible? The Human Context 7:367–372.Shuman, D. W. 1996. Commentary on “Multiple personality and moral responsibility.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:59–60.Sprigge, T. 1996. Commentary on “Minds, memes, and multiples.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:31–36.Wallace, K. 1996. Commentary on “Lumps and bumps.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3:17–20.Wells, L. A. 1995. Commentary on “True wishes.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:315–317.Wiggins, O. P., and M. A. Schwartz. 1995. Chris Walker’s interpretation of Karl Jaspers’ phenomenology: a critique. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2:319–343.BooksAmerican Hospital Association. 1994. Values in conflict: Resolving ethical issues in health care. 2nd ed. Chicago: American Hospital Association.American Medical Association. 1992. Code of medical ethics: Annotated current opinions of the council on ethical and judicial affairs. Chicago: American Medical Association.———. 1994. Council on ethical and judicial affairs... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS I05 1120a): these and much else form models of the meticulousness and also the daring with which such discussions should be conducted. THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER University of Washington Religious Philosophy, A Group ol Essays.By Harry Austryn Wolfson. (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xii + 278. $6.00.) For those who have never dared to take the plunge into one of Professor Wolfson's massive studies--the two-volume sets (...) on Philo and Spinoza, for instance, or the first part of The Philosophy of the Church Fathers--these ten essays offer a series of brief but enlightening introductory paddles. The eleventh piece, a concluding Sermonette, is neither enlightening nor a happy introduction to a rigorous mind. The essays, ranging over a considerable number of Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and secular thinkers, are entitled as follows: "The Philonic God of Revelation and His Latter-day Deniers"; "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas"; "Immortality and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers"; "Philosophical Implications of the Theology of Cyril of Jerusalem"; "Philosophical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism"; "Saint Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy"; "Ibn Khaldun on Attributes and Predestination "; "Causality and Freedom in Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume"; "The Veracity of Scripture from Philo to Spinoza"; "Spinoza and the Religion of the Past." Despite this wide variety of topics, the book is held together, Wolfson assures us, by a "common theme" (p. v). To accept this theme is, in effect, to look at the history of Western religious philosophy from New Testament times to Spinoza's in a very special way. Picking up three histories of philosophy at random, I find that Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy mentions the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (20? mC.--A.D. 54?) on two pages; B. A. G. Fuller's History of Philosophy devotes about three and a half pages to Philo but concludes that "Philo seems to have had no disciples of note and no direct influence, at any rate, upon the century and a half that intervenes between his death and the birth of Plotinus" (p. 305); W. T. Jones in his History of Western Philosophy (Vol. I) rates Philo's worth at just over a page and a caustic footnote. If, however, we look at religious philosophy in Wolfson's way, we see Philo as the root and determining origin of all medieval philosophizing, Jewish, Christian and Muslim ; we further see the medieval philosophy begun by Philo as a homogeneous system of thought, lying between pagan Greek speculations and the secular systems of the seventeenth century. Wolfson writes: 106 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Ostensibly Philo is only the interpreter of the Hebrew Scriptures in terms of Greek philosophy. But actually he is more than that. He is the interpreter of Greek philosophy in terms of certain fundamental teachings of his Hebrew Scripture, whereby he revolutionised philosophy and remade it into what became the common philosophy of the three religions with cognate Scriptures, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (p. v). In all the essays the topics are taken partly as Philonic in origin; it is Wolfson's aim to make the quarrels of medieval and later thinkers more intelligible in the light of their positions' intellectual ancestry. The result of his approach is a series of amazingly dexterous historical investigations; the reader moves with quite unexpected ease through intricate thirty-page discussions, each carrying some hundred or so footnotes of far-flung references to Plato, Aristotle, Scripture, Jewish and Arabic commentators, Patristic hagglers, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, et alii. The burden of erudition is wielded with simplicity and grace. Where there are historical obscurities and misunderstandings to be cleared up, one reads Wolfson with gratitude and enjoyment. Perhaps I can best fulfill my role as reviewer by summarizing part of his sixth and most exciting chapter, that on the controversy of Pelagius and Augustine over human freedom. Here Wolfson sets out to reverse history's verdict: to show Pelagius' account of freedom as keeping to "the original Christian belief"; to show Augustine's views as heretical by the measure of previous Christian tradition. He begins with much-documented observations that Greek pagan philosophy establishes a tension in man between the powers of... (shrink)